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The legal practice of physician-assisted suicide provides individuals
with the means to hasten the process of dying; this is a unique opportunity
one might take for an array of reasons. Legally, the right to die is only vested
in individuals with a terminal illness, so the grounds for pursuing a physicianassisted suicide stem from the strains and fears prompted by this illness.
Individuals request physician-assisted suicide most commonly for diseaserelated pain and suffering, inability to enjoy activities, fear of a loss of
autonomy or future suffering, and belief their existence is a burden. 2
Although it is a serious and rather somber practice, physician-assisted suicide
can be beneficial and necessary given a bleak enough situation, in which an
individual’s pain crosses into the realm of inhumane. Moreover, the
solemnity of such an operation comes with a lot at stake. The law surrounding
the practice of physician-assisted suicide must be composed in such a fashion,
with certain regulations and restrictions in place, so that its capacities of
legally relieving individuals from their agonizing existence does not teeter
with the illegal practice of euthanasia.
Although the conversation began in California and Washington, the
state of Oregon was the first state to make successful strides in the right to
die campaign.3 Oregon first passed the “Death With Dignity” act during
November of 1994 in a referendum that won by a vote of 51% to 49%. 4
However, its implementation was delayed until 1997 due to a legal
injunction.5 This law, having found its first narrow success in Oregon, could
be accredited to the progressive sentiment in the state, especially regarding
health. The state of Oregon has progressive advance directive laws in place,
and the citizens have a tendency to use the initiative power as an instrument
of legal and social change as seen throughout history.6 The “Death With
Dignity” law states that terminally ill Oregonians are allowed to end their
*

Fordham College at Rose Hill, Class of 2023.
See Ellen Wiebe et al., Reasons for requesting medical assistance in dying, 64 Canadian
Family Physician 674-679 (2018),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327653265_Reasons_for_requesting_medical_as
sistance_in_dying.
3
See Initiative for Death with Dignity Act, 1991 Wash. Legis. Serv. Init. Meas. 119 (West);
See California Death With Dignity Act, 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 161 (West).
4
See Sandra Norman-Eady, Oregon’s Assisted Suicide Law, cga.ct.gov (2020),
https://www.cga.ct.gov/2002/rpt/2002-R-0077.htm.
5
Id.
6
See Tom Bates & Mark O’Keefe, On Suicide Measure, Oregon Is a Maverick Again, The
Oregonian, (Nov. 13, 1994).
1

2

2020]

FORDHAM UNDERGRADUATE LAW REVIEW

2

lives through the voluntary self-administration of lethal medications,
expressly prescribed by a physician for that purpose.7 To utilize the Death
with Dignity Act, the law requires residency in Oregon, 18 years or more of
age, psychological health, and a terminal illness dictating one has less than 6
months to live.8 These requirements are matched with an appropriately
rigorous request process that requires the patient to undergo multiple oral and
written requests witnessed by various parties 9, along with certain
requirements by the physician ensuring complete certainty and mental
coherence in their decision. 10 The law ensures that the act of euthanasia, or
any process in which the physician is making the final life-ending action, is
strictly prohibited. It reduces physician-assisted death to prescription by the
physician, requiring the individual to administer the life-ending medicine
themselves. This detail is requisite to avoid infringing upon the pre-existing
law in Oregon, amongst other states, that restricts the precipitation of
suicide.11 A facet of the act states that ending one’s life in accordance to the
law does not constitute suicide, which also contributes to the protection of
physicians from criminal prosecution. 12
The state of Montana currently lacks a law that allows for physicianassisted suicide; so, since the Supreme Court has determined that the right to
physician-assisted suicide exists nowhere in the United States Constitution,
this right is rooted in the Montana State Constitution.13 A state constitution
can by no means abridge the rights set forth by the United States Constitution,
however, it can serve to expand those rights. This was the clear intent of the
1972 Montana Constitution; Article 2, Sections 4 and 10 address an
individual's right to privacy and dignity, and these expanded rights apply to
an individual in their quest to die with dignity. 14 The State Constitution’s
Section pertaining to the right to privacy states that “the right of individual
privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall not be
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infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest” 15, while the
section pertaining to dignity states “the dignity of the human being is
inviolable, no person shall be denied the equal protection of the law.” 16 With
the unique constitutional language that makes up Montana’s state constitution
in place, citizens are afforded a greater right to privacy than they are in other
states, as stated by the Montana Supreme Court. 17 To exercise one’s right to
privacy in Montana, an individual is required to elucidate an expectation of
privacy that society must agree with; this plays out in court using the Katz
test18 -to determine whether this is valid or not. 19 Thus in the case of a
terminally-ill person who is suffering and near death, it must be reasonably
recognized by other Montanans that a physician-assisted suicide falls under
their state-mandated right to privacy.20
In 42 states, there are statutes that prohibit aiding or assisting a
suicide, along with 6 other states where this is illegal due to common law. 21
This statue exists in Montana, regarding such an act as either a felony or
homicide based on how successful the suicide attempt is.22 From a regulatory
standpoint, Oregon, and the states that have taken after its model, differ from
Montana due to the fact that an actual law was passed, which states that
"actions taken in accordance with the Act shall not, for any purpose,
constitute suicide, assisted suicide, mercy killing or homicide, under the
law.”23 Montana’s method of regulating physician-assisted suicide can be
reduced to a singular law criminalizing assisted suicide that, may not
withstand the stern test of constitutionality due to its broad and restrictive
nature.24 For this reason, Montana should adopt a model similar to Oregon’s
Death With Dignity Act to conduct physician-assisted suicide appropriately
and avoid legal complications; the state can allow its citizens the freedom of
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a hastened demise without teetering with situations of euthanasia. Along with
the concise language that properly regulates the practice of physician-assisted
suicide within the Act, it also features reasonable safeguards necessary for
dealing with fragile patients nearing the end of their lives. These safeguards
include presenting patients with the option for palliative care, ensuring
competency in all patients making end-of-life decisions for themselves,
ensuring voluntariness in requests, obtaining a second opinion on the case,
requiring persistence in their request spanning over a two-week interval,
encouraging the involvement of the next of kin, and requiring physicians to
notify OPHD of all cases in which a prescription for the purpose of assisted
suicide has been written.25
The practice of physician-assisted suicide is very advantageous,
which is why installing the proper regulatory measures is such an important
matter. This notion can be elucidated best by an example from David
Orentlicher. He describes a young adult, disheartened from a recent romantic
breakup, who is temporarily ventilator-dependent due to asthma-related
issues. On the other hand, you have an individual plagued by widely
metastatic cancer, nearing the end of a thorough and rewarding life. They are
looking for an option to hasten the dying process because they cannot seem
to physically endure the pain and struggle to justify why they would prolong
this inevitable conclusion. 26 This situation takes place in a state that has not
granted its citizens the right to a physician-assisted suicide. Given that
competent individuals have the freedom to refuse life-sustaining treatment as
declared in Cruzan vs. Director, yet they do not have the freedom to a
physician-assisted suicide, the young individual with asthma has the ability
to end his suffering, while the older individual with metastic cancer does
not.27 Not only does this dichotomy reveal how similar the practices of
physician-assisted suicide and treatment withdrawal can be, but it highlights
how situations requiring treatment withdrawal can look just as questionable
as those requiring physician-assisted suicide. At the end of the day, they are
both means to die, and more specifically, ways to end the suffering that an
individual deems as inhumane.
Orentlicher also brings up that “if the right to die reflects the
individual’s right to be free of inhumane suffering, then it is hard to
distinguish in principle between persons who are terminally ill and those who
25
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are not.”28 Although this logic is sound, the restriction of physician-assisted
suicide to the terminally ill is the only way individuals in need can benefit
from this practice without negative repercussions like the normalization of
suicide. The laws in Montana that allow physician-assisted suicide fall within
the Montana State Constitution, and pertain to an individual’s right to
“inviolable dignity”29 and “essential privacy”30.These laws must be justified
by a compelling state interest and narrowly tailored to effectuate only that
interest.31 Any right that a healthy individual might have to take his or her
own life is outweighed by the state's compelling interest in the preservation
of life.32 When viewing this right at its core of granting individuals an end to
inhumane suffering, the terminally ill in particular have a right to physicianassisted suicide over the healthy because it is a matter the state interest is less
compelled to restrict. Moreover, the right to physician-assisted suicide is such
a salient matter for the terminally ill because they lack the agencies to produce
this same effect given that they are bedridden in a safe, surveyed environment
unlike healthy individuals who have access to instruments that would make
a physician-assisted suicide more or less irrelevant.33 Physician-assisted
suicide is a practice that can produce the desired effect for many individuals,
it just needs proper regulation.
Montana’s restriction of physician-assisted suicide to strictly the
terminally ill by subjecting the matter to the state’s compelling interest is
valid, but the state’s regulation of this matter as a mere statute is insufficient
given its vulnerability to constitutional incongruency. When viewed under
the scope of constitutionality, Montana’s current law restricting assisted
suicide might not survive to serve its purpose because it is problematically
broad and strict. The lack of regulation could teeter with offenses like
euthanasia and could yield many legal drawbacks. Considering that the
practice of physician-assisted suicide is advantageous in delivering
individuals from inhumane suffering, the state of Montana should take the
same regulatory steps as Oregon to properly conduct this beneficial practice.
***
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